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1Non-Technical Summary
In 1991, Scotland paid 50.75 million pounds for Motorola to locate a mobile-phone
factory employing 3,000 people. In the late 1980s, Toyota was offered an incentive package
worth 125--147 million dollars in present value for a plant expected to employ 3,000 workers.
Other empirical studies have found positive effects of foreign direct investment (FDI) on dif-
ferent indicators of firm's performance in Indonesia, Russia and Lithuania.
These studies show that an increase in FDI leads to an increase in the level of local
capability and competition. However, the results vary across countries and across industries
within a particular country. Theory suggests that FDI has direct and indirect impacts. Direct
FDI effects contribute to the differences in performance of firms with and without FDI. Indi-
rect or spillover effects are spread through specific contacts between multi-national corpora-
tions and domestic firms. Negative spillovers have been found, for example, for Venezuela,
Romania and Poland. While some empirical work on FDI has been done for several transition
countries, this is not the case yet for Ukraine.
In this study, we examine the effect of industry–wide and region–wide spillovers on
the optimal level of exports of Ukrainian manufacturing firms. Based on a theoretical model
of oligopolistic competition augmented with spillover effects, we hypothesize that a domestic
manufacturing firm’s performance, measured by the volume of exports, responds both to in-
dustry–wide and region–wide spillover effects. The theoretical predictions concerning the ef-
fects of industry–wide spillover are ambiguous, they can be either positive or negative. To test
this hypothesis we utilize an unpublished dataset of about 2000 firms for the years 1996–2000
of Ukrainian manufacturing firms.
Our empirical findings show that large firms benefit more from foreign direct invest-
ment than small firms. Compared to non–durable goods makers, durable–goods makers are to
a higher extent affected by industry–wide FDI spillovers, because production of a durable
good is likely to require a larger number of backward and forward linkages within both the
same industry and region. Finally, urban area firms benefit more from FDI spillovers com-
pared to firms in non–urban areas. FDI also promotes exports due to regional spillovers.
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3THE EFFECTS OF REGIONAL AND INDUSTRY–WIDE FDI SPILLOVERS ON EXPORT OF UKRAINIAN
FIRMS
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the effects of region and industry–wide spillovers from foreign di-
rect investment (FDI) on the volumes of export of Ukrainian manufacturing firms, using un-
published panel data from 1996–2000. Economic theory suggests that FDI has direct and indi-
rect effects on firm’s performance. Our analysis focuses on the indirect effects like competi-
tion and linkage effects through industrial and regional spillovers respectively. We use a sim-
ple Cournot competition model in order to test for industrial and regional spillovers. The es-
timation results suggest that large firms, durable–goods makers, and firms located in urban
areas benefit most from FDI spillovers.
Keywords: transition economies, Ukraine, foreign direct investment, spillovers.
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41 Introduction
„In January 2003 Procter & Gamble announced it would be is closing its Tampax tampon
factory in Leigh Park, Havant, Hants, United Kingdom and shifting the production of its fac-
tories in Boryspil, Kyiv Region, and Budapest, Hungary. Procter & Gamble says the move is
necessary to keep its business competitive. The Tambrands–Ukraine plant in Boryspil was
established in the meantime. The plant manufactures Tampax hygienic tampons a high per-
centage of which are exported into the Eastern and Western European countries. In November
of 2002 Procter and Gamble Eastern Europe launched a new Distribution Center in Lviv,
Ukraine. The Distribution Center was the first in Ukraine and the second in Eastern Europe.
This P&G complex includes customs operations, storage, pre–sale preparation according to
the needs of consumers, forming of the orders and loading of goods.“1
Indeed, Procter & Gamble have penetrated the Ukrainian market. However, several
questions arise: What has happened to Ukrainian companies in the same industry? Have other
firms in the same region been affected? Do domestic firms profit from new technologies in-
troduced by P&G or do they exit the market, unable to compete?
Theory tells us about direct and indirect effects of foreign direct investment. Foreign
companies hire local workers and increase aggregate demand and supply. At the same time,
there are indirect effects also called spillover effects. The channels of these effects are: tech-
nology transfer effect, competition effect, backward and forward linkage effect, training ef-
fect, and demonstration effect.
The technology transfer channel has recently received justification theoretically
(Blomström, 1987; Blomström and Kokko, 1997) and empirically through investigations for
Indonesia (Sjöholm, 1999) and Russia (Ponomareva, 2000; Yudaeva et al., 2001). It is also
found that foreign presence in the sector does not have any significant effects on productivity
of Czech manufacturing firms (Kinoshita, 2000) or similar firms in Wroclaw region, Poland
(Hardy, 1998).
5The competition effect  is found to have both positive and negative impacts. Positive
spillovers are found in Canadian and Australian manufacturing industries (Caves, 1974), and
in Indonesian banks (Cho, 1990). However, negative effects are observed in Belgian manu-
facturing industries (De Backer and Sleuwagen, 2003). Konings (2001) uses firm–level panel
data from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania to find that only in Poland foreign firms outperform
domestic firms, while there is evidence for negative (Bulgaria and Romania) or no (Poland)
spillovers of FDI. He concludes that during earlier stages of transition (Bulgaria and Roma-
nia) the positive technology spillover effect seems to be dominated by the negative competi-
tion effect of FDI, as inefficient domestic firms will lose market share to foreign firms. In
later stages of development (Poland), when domestic firms have started restructuring, and
market competition has increased, the competition effect seems to disappear.
FDI–induced backward and forward linkages can push industrial development, espe-
cially with regard to the formation of small businesses. FDI creates backward linkages, for in-
stance, by foreign firms purchasing local services and subcontracting with domestic firms.
Observing small businesses along the border of Mexico, it is found that the linkage approach
reasonably describes the development of small business employment (Brown, 2002). On the
other hand, there is little evidence for both backward and forward linkages for the German–
owned manufacturing sector in the north–east of England (Kirchner, 2000) and for Korean
FDI in southeast Asia, (Lee 1994).
The investigation of the training spillovers channel has also recently received atten-
tion from researchers. Foreign firms invest in human capital, and it is not only the foreign
MNC but also domestic firms that benefit from this. Many managerial people in Mexico start
their career in a foreign company and are later employed in a domestic firm (Blomström,
1989). Moreover, domestic firms are afraid of loosing their market shares and they too invest
in training their workers and managerial personnel (Kinoshita, 1998).
Although the demonstration effect is potentially very important, so far there are not
enough studies to show this, neither are there enough studies which distinguish demonstration
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6effects in different countries or industries (Blomström and Kokko, 1998). In an analysis of
Belgian manufacturing firms it is observed that although in the short term FDI might crowd
out domestic firms, in the long run, positive structural effects such as demonstration effects
might lessen or even inverse the crowding out effects (de Backer and Sleuwagen, 2003).
However, all empirical papers above have a rather weak theoretical background. We
contribute to the existing literature on foreign direct investment by developing a simple Cour-
not competition model augmented with spillover effects and test this model empirically using
data of Ukrainian manufacturing firms.
The dataset used in this paper consists of an unbalanced panel of all manufacturing
firms in Ukraine obtained from the Education and Economic Research Consortium (EERC)
database over the 1996–2000 period. On balance, we have annual data on 8,500 firms, one
quarter of which export their production.
This research provides evidence for a positive relationship between the optimal level
of exports and industry–wide spillovers from foreign direct investment. The magnitude of
these effects varies between all, large and small firms, durable and non–durable goods mak-
ers, large city and small town firms. Another significant and positive factor in most specifica-
tions is domestic investment on industry level, while the number of domestic firms in the in-
dustry has a significantly negative effect.
The following section presents a simple Cournot competition model augmented with
spillover effects. Section 3 describes the data and Section 4 discusses the empirical results.
Finally, Section 5 concludes and gives suggestions for policy makers.
2 Augmented Monopolistic Competition Model
2.1 The Model
A simple monopolistic competition model augmented with spillover effects, implies that do-
7mestic firm changes its quantities in response to foreign presence in the industry or region.2
The home country economy consists of Hn  domestic firms and Fn  foreign firms that compete
at third country markets. All firms produce a homogeneous goods and compete in quantities.
We assume that the demand, P , for a good produced by both domestic and foreign firm is
linear. Let 1Hq  be a representative domestic firm’s output and 1Fq  be a representative foreign
firm’s output.3
( ) ( )1 11 1= - - - - - -H H H F F FP a b n q bq b n q by (1)
Marginal cost of domestic firm is denoted as Hc . Every domestic firm faces marginal
cost, but also spends Hj  for R&D investment. The firm cannot fully protect its stock of
knowledge, and the investment spills over to other firms. We denote q  as a spillover coeffi-
cient for funds invested by foreign firms (FDI) and z  as a spillover coefficient for funds in-
vested by ( 1-Hn ) other domestic firms. We assume that the more other firms invest, the
lower marginal costs of the representative domestic firm are.
Similarly Fc  is the marginal cost of the foreign firm, but foreign firms are differently
affected by spillovers compared to domestic firms. We denote b  as spillover effect from the
foreign sector and y  as spillover effect from the domestic sector. We also assume
1 0> > >q z  and 1 0> > >b y , which means that spillover effects from foreign firms are
stronger that those from domestic firms for any firm. A foreign firm also invests Fj  in R&D.
Moreover, domestic firms benefit more from foreign spillovers, which is represented by
>q b 4
[ ]1 ( 1)= - + - -H F F H Hc w j n j nq z (2)
                                               
2See for example models by Siotis (1999), Leahy and Pavelin (2002).
3Symmetry among domestic firms and symmetry among foreign firms are assumed. However, domestic firms
technologies are different from foreign firms’ ones.
4So far w  is the same for both firms domestic and foreign. Later we relax this assumption allowing for different
marginal costs.
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Representative domestic and foreign firms maximize their profits in the current period
of time as described in Equations (4) and (5):
1
1 1max -
H
H H Hq
Pq c q (4)
1
1 1max -
F
F F Fq
Pq c q (5)
Assuming symmetry we receive the following first order conditions:
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Solving this system we receive optimal the quantity, Hq , for the domestic firm:
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This equation relates presence of foreign firms in the industry to the output of the rep-
resentative domestic firm.
Taking the derivative of equation (6) with respect to the number of foreign firms in the
industry, Fn , we receive Equation (7), where the sign of the derivative can be either positive
or negative:
[ ]
2
2 ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
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F F H F F HH
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(7)
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The entrance of the foreign firm is likely to have positive effects if the spillover effect
9from foreign to domestic firms is much higher compared to the spillover effect from foreign
to foreign firm, >>q b .
When the foreign firm enters the market it invests Fj  and the more it invests the
higher is the domestic firm’s output:
2( )
( 1 )
+ + + -¶
=
¶ + +
F F FH F
F H F
n n nq n
j b n n
q b q b
(8)
2.2 Model Parametrization
Equation (6) is not linear in Fn , Hn , Hj , Fj  or w , and in Appendix 1
5, we transform it into a
linearized form:
0
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, ,, , ,= + + + + +F H H FF it H it itn n j j wH it H it F itq j jn n wf f f f f f (9)
ˆ itw  is parameterized as a linear function of the deviation in several regional spillovers,
scale variables and volume of q  at 1-t .6 The reasoning for this parametrization is the fol-
lowing. Every firm has its specific marginal cost, that depends not only on firm characteristics
but also on the firm’s environment. This marginal cost is higher if the number of potential
customers is low or transaction costs are high. Thus, if a firm is surrounded by a richer variety
of other firms who also invest in R&D or have some experience of selling the product, then its
costs have to be lower.
0 1ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, , , , -= + + + + + + +F H F Hit it F it H iti SC x x y y q itF it H it ity y qw Scale x xx x x x x x x e (10)
where 0ix  is the firm–specific level of marginal cost, which enters as the firm fixed ef-
fect, itScale  is the deviation in the size of the firm, ˆ ,F itx  is the deviation in the number of for-
eign firms in the region, ˆ ,H itx  is the deviation in the number of domestic firms in the region,
ˆ ,F ity  is the deviation in the volume of FDI for a firm in the region, ˆ ,H ity  is the deviation in the
volume of domestic investment for a firm in the region, 1ˆ -itq  is the deviation in the volume of
                                               
5The coefficients are described there.
6We parametrize ˆ itw  because we do not have any data on firm’s costs.
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production in the previous period and ite  is an error term.
Plugging Equation (10) into Equation (9) we receive our econometric model specifi-
cation:
0 0
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ ˆ, ,, , ,= + + + + + + +F H H FF it H itt w i n n j j scH it H it F itq j jn nf f x f f f f f (11)
ˆ ˆˆ ˆ, , , ,+ + + + + +F H F Hit F it H itw x w x w y w yF it H ity yScale x xf x f x f x f x
1ˆ , -+ +W q w iti tqf x f e
The data on firms’ investment is not present in our dataset and we transform our
model into the final model specification
0 0ˆ ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ, ,= + + - + - + +F F H F HF it H itw i n j n j j Hit Jq n nf f x f f f f f (12)
ˆ ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ, ,,+ + + - + - +F F F H Hit F it H itj w sc w x y w x yF it Scale x xJf f x f x x f x x
1ˆ ˆ ˆ, , , -+ + + +F Hw y w y W q w itF it H it i tqY Yf x f x f x f e
where (the natural logarithm of) the volume of export is the dependent variable, HJ  is
the total volume of domestic investment in the industry, FJ  is the total volume of foreign in-
vestment in the industry, HY  is the total volume of domestic investment in the region and FY
is the volume of foreign investment in the region. Because of our data restrictions we investi-
gate the spillover effect only for exporting firms.7
We would expect a positive sign on 
Fn
f  if higher levels of export are associated with a
higher number of foreign firms in the industry, and a negative sign on 
Hn
f  if higher levels of
export have a negative correlation with a higher number of domestic firms in the industry.
The scale effect is proxied by the number of workers in the firm.
According to our model, the competition effect is captured by industry spillovers vari-
ables.8 This can be explained by the fact that increased foreign presence in the industry forces
local firms to act more efficiently, improve the quality of their product, decrease the primary
                                               
7We made an attempt to employ sales as a dependent variable but received strong misspecification of our model.
8In our paper these effect are described by the number of foreign firms in the industry and the volume of foreign
direct investment in the industry.
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cost of production, and to start exporting the goods. However, it is possible to receive nega-
tive effects, namely when foreign firms penetrate the domestic industry in order to buy the
exporting firms and capture their shares in third country markets.9
Forward-backward linkages effect can appear through regional spillovers.10 Foreign-
owned firms usually require high quality input materials which leads to an improvement of
local material supplies. For instance, Oleh Strekal, spokesman for McDonald’s Ukraine Lim-
ited, said in his interview „.... the fast food monolith has pumped some 70 million USD into
its Ukrainian ventures, with most of the funds flowing into the local economy. McDonald’s
has kept 50 Ukrainian construction companies busy building outlets across Ukraine. Domestic
vendors Chumak, Galakton, Slavyansky Dom and the Vinnytsya meat processing plant supply
products that find their way into McDonald’s hamburgers and shakes. Ukrainian ingredients
now account for about 40 percent of McDonald’s products. The company plans to increase
that figure to 95 percent within two years."11
It is very difficult to distinguish the other spillover channels, due to data limitations.
Identifying demonstration effect and training effect would require additional firm specific
variables such as labor turnover, innovation, et cetera.
3 Data description
We use a dataset of Ukrainian manufacturing firms for testing our hypotheses. It covers on
average 8,500 firms for the period 1996 to 2000. 2,100 of these firms export their products.
The firms are classified by a two–digit Industrial Classification and represent sixteen indus-
trial sectors: energy, fuel, coal, black metallurgy, color metallurgy, chemical, oil–chemicals,
machinery, forest, construction materials, light, food, flavor, microbiology, medical equip-
ment, printing and other. Firms are localized over twenty seven geographical regions, cover-
                                               
9It can be a case when a foreign firm wants to acquire the domestic company in the same industry in order to
close the latter and capture a larger share of the market.
10We proxy regional spillovers by the number of foreign firms in the region and the volume of foreign direct
investment in the region.
11Citation: http://www.artukraine.com/commercial/mcdonalds2.htm
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ing Crimea Autonomous Republic, twenty four „oblast“, cities Kyiv and Sevastopil. We util-
ize EERC’s data items „volumes of export“, Export  in our annotation, and "number of work-
ers", Labor  here.12 Moreover, as a proxy for the number of firms in the industry or in the re-
gion we use the number of firms in our dataset.13
A number of sample selection criteria is applied to the original sample. First, all nega-
tive values for volume of export and number of workers variables in the sample are dropped.14
Secondly, the firms with a volume of exports higher than the 99 percentile or lower than the 1
percentile are also excluded. We prefer to use the screened data to reduce the potential impact
of outliers upon the parameter estimates. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for firm spe-
cific variables.
In order to test the effects of spillovers on firms facing similar characteristics, the da-
taset is split into two categories: large and small firms. A firm is considered to be „large“ if its
number of workers is above the 75th percentile by year. If a firm’s number of workers is be-
low the 25th percentile by year, then it is classified as „small“.15 A two–sample paired t–test
is used to test for the equality of means and we receive significant differences in the behavior
of large and small firms.
Moreover, we investigate the spillover effect for „durable“ and „non–durable“ goods
makers. This classification is based on the dichotomy proposed by Sharpe (1994): First, we
find the correlation between sales and nominal GNP. Second, firms with an average correla-
tion higher than 60th percentile are considered as durable goods makers, while firms with cor-
relation on average lower than 40th percentile are denoted as non–durable goods makers.
In order to control for agglomeration effects, we consider a subsample of „city“ firms
located in regions where there are cities with population one million or more.16 Compared to
the rest of the country’s average, all these regions are characterized by much higher volumes
                                               
12Export is estimated in 1,000 USD.
13Our data are assumed to cover all manufacturing production in Ukraine. However, it is just a proxy for the
number of firms in the region or industry because some data could be lost during the process of collecting.
14None of our variables can have negative values.
15A similar categorization is done by Baum et al. (2003a).
16„City“ firms are located in Lviv, Odesa, Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropertrovsk, Zaporizhzhia regions and Kyiv
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of FDI and a higher number of manufacturing firms receiving FDI. For example, on average
112 such firms are located in the Dnipropetrovsk region which is more than the total of FDI
firms in Kherson, Chernivtsi, Chernigiv, Kirovograd and Volyn region. „Ncity“ firms are lo-
cated in the remaining regions.
From the data distribution by industry (Table 4) we see that some industries are char-
acterized by high levels of exports but low levels of FDI (e.g. color metallurgy) while some
are characterized by high levels of both exports and FDI (e.g. black metallurgy).
4 Regional and Industry–Wide Spillovers Effects
We estimate Equation (12) for all firms and several splits of firms, using ordinary least
square, fixed-effect, one-step Generalized Method of Moments (GMM), and two-step GMM
estimation.17 The results are given in Tables 5-8. In all estimations, the dependent variable is
the logarithm of exports. The independent variables are number of workers; the number of
foreign/home firms in the region; the number of foreign/home firms in the industry; the loga-
rithm of investment of foreign/home firms in the region; the logarithm of investment of for-
eign/home firms in the industry and the lagged level of logarithm of export.
Table 5, column (1) in the Appendix describes the results for OLS estimations. These
are ex ante biased but we still add them into the analysis for comparison.18 According to them,
entrance of one foreign firm has a positive effect on exports in the same industry and no sig-
nificant effect at region level. The level of FDI in an industry is negatively associated with the
volume of exports, which is opposite to our anticipations. However, the impact of domestic
firms’ activity corresponds to our predictions. Higher levels of domestic investment in the in-
dustry are correlated with higher levels of export in the same industry, while the entrance of
additional firms into the industry decreases volumes of export in the same industry.
                                                                                                                                                    
city.
17We did not include the estimation using random–effect estimator because because results of the Hausman test
strongly support the use of fixed–effect estimators.
18OLS results are upwards biased while fixed effect model results are downward biased. The coefficient near
lagged value of log of export for GMM estimation is between OLS and WITHIN estimators that supports
14
Fixed–effect estimation results correspond better to our theoretical anticipations (Ta-
ble 5, column 2). They provide some evidence that there are positive industrial spillovers
from FDI, namely that there is a significantly positive impact of foreign presence on firms’
exports in the same industry. This suggests significant linkage effects. There are also signifi-
cant effects of the number of domestic firms on the volume of exports in the same region
(positive) and industry (negative).
Tables 6–8 describe the results of testing our theoretical model using dynamic panel
estimator for three different splits: durable–gods makers and non–durable–goods makers;
small firms and large firms; city firms and non–city firms. Columns (1) and (3) of each table
represent models using one–step estimation, while columns (2) and (4) describe two–step es-
timation. The model is estimated using an orthogonal transformation instrumented by all
available moment restrictions starting from ( 1-t ).19
The correctness of the respective model specification is checked using the Sargan test.
We compute the Sargan test for each two–step GMM model and we do not receive rejection
for our overidentified restrictions at 10% level.20 Heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are
controlled for by using robust standard errors and by examining the Arellano–Bond second
order autocorrelation test. Consistency of GMM in our model relies on the property that we
do not have second- (or higher-) order autocorrelation. Otherwise, we would have started with
moment restrictions starting from 2-t .
In the analysis for the „all“ firms dataset (Table 5, columns (3) and (4)), we receive
                                                                                                                                                    
appropriateness of GMM usage. For details, see Bond (2002).
19 The orthogonal transformation uses
i(t 1) iT* 1/ 2
it it
x ... x T t
x (x )( )
T t T t 1
+ + + -= -
- - -
where the transformed variable does not depend on its lagged values. If we use first differences instead
of an orthogonal transformation we will have to instrument with moment restrictions starting from 2-t  which
will lead to dropping additional 20% of the available data.
20Note, we do not report Sargan test results for one–step GMM results. Sargan test has an asymptotic chi–
squared distribution only in the case of homoscedastic error terms. Our dataset is very heteroscedastic that is
why we receive rejection of overidentifying restrictions in most cases. Arellano and Bond (1991) also mention
that the Sargan test on the one–step estimation often leads to rejection of the null hypothesis that the
overidentifying restrictions are valid.
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evidence for positive industry spillover effects. For instance, the entrance of a foreign firm in
a region increases the exports of a company in that region by 0.52 %. Although we do not find
strong evidence for regional spillovers of FDI on export, there is significant evidence for re-
gional spillovers from domestic investment.
One interesting contrast is observed for the „durable“ and „non–durable“ goods mak-
ers split as described in Table 6. Results for non–durable firms suggest positive regional spill-
overs from domestic firms, while there seem to be no significant effects from foreign firms at
all. On the other hand, the results are much stronger for durable–goods makers: Entrance of
one foreign firm into the industry increases the level of exports of a domestic firm in that in-
dustry by 0.94 %, while entrance of one foreign firm in the region increases the level of ex-
ports of a domestic firm in the same region by 0.44%.
Comparing the results for „small“ and „large“ firms (Table 7), one can see that the
number of foreign firms in the region does not seem to have any effect on small domestic
firms’ exports, while there are highly significant regional spillovers for large firms (at 1%
level): An increase in the number of foreign firms in the region by one increases a domestic
firm’s exports by 1.28 %. Concerning industry spillovers, the number of foreign firms does
not have a significant effect at 5 %–level in either small or large firms’ subsamples. The effect
of a domestic firms’ presence in the region is positive and significant at 1% for large firms
only: A one unit rise in the number of domestic firms in the industry raises domestic firms’
exports by 0.76 %. There is little evidence for regional spillovers from domestic investment in
the region. A similar picture evolves for the number of domestic firms in the industry: The ef-
fect is not significantly different from zero.
The results for „city“ and „ncity“ firms (Table 8) are also quite striking: Firms in the
former category are significantly affected by foreign firms’ activities. Entrance of one foreign
firm in the region or in the industry leads to an increase of the level of exports by 1.10 % and
0.43 % respectively. The level of domestic investment in the region also has a significant and
positive effect, while the number of domestic firms has no effect on volumes of export. At the
same time, „ncity“ firms do not seem to benefit from foreign firms in the region or in the in-
16
dustry. However, those firms benefit from both an increase in domestic firms’ investment in
the region and an increase in the number of firms in the region.
In summary, we find support for the model’s predictions on the effect of industry–
wide FDI spillovers for the „all firms“ data set of considered firms. However, the regional
spillover effect is only marginally significant. For different categories of firms, we receive
varying results. The results are stronger for large firms, city firms and durable good makers.
For any specification, there is no evidence for negative competition effects. Large firms can
more easily adjust the quality of their production to meet the requirements of foreign firms in
the region or even export their products. Similarly, Sinani and Meyer (2002) argue that large
firms have more resources to invest in absorbing new technology of foreign firms, or to attract
better qualified labor in order to cope with increased competition from foreign firms. Interest-
ingly, Aitken and Harrison (1999) arrive at quite different results. In a study of 4000 Vene-
zuelan firms, they concluded that only small firms’21 productivity significantly benefits from
FDI, while there is no significant effect on large firms. Most foreign firms are located in the
urban area, very few being situated far from large cities. This is likely to decrease transaction
costs for firms in urban areas and create an environment in which industry–wide spillovers
might be important, so that entrance of a foreign firm in a large city region has a larger effect
on exports of a firm in an urban area than on a domestic firm in a non–urban area. Finally, the
industry–wide spillover effect might be significant for durable–goods makers because this
type of production requires higher level of backward and forward linkages within the same
industry.
5 Conclusions
We examine the effect of industry–wide and region–wide spillovers on the optimal level of
exports. Based on a simple monopolistic competition model augmented with spillover effects,
we hypothesize that a domestic manufacturing firm’s performance, measured by the volume
of exports, responds both to industry–wide and region–wide spillover effects. If foreign pres-
17
ence in the industry increases, then the volume of exports of a representative firm should in-
crease as well. The theoretical predictions concerning the effects of industry–wide spillover
are ambiguous, they can be either positive or negative. To test this hypothesis we utilize a
dataset of 8,000 firm years of Ukrainian manufacturing firms.
Our empirical findings show that large firms benefit more from foreign direct invest-
ment than small firms, because they have sufficient capacities to absorb foreign firms’ tech-
nologies. Compared to non–durable goods makers, durable–goods makers are to a higher ex-
tent affected by industry–wide FDI spillovers, because production of a durable good is likely
to require a larger number of backward and forward linkages within both the same industry
and region. Finally, urban area firms benefit more from FDI spillovers compared to firms in
non–urban areas. FDI also promotes exports due to regional spillovers. However, there is a
threshold level of FDI which seems necessary for indirect FDI effects to occur.
Ukrainian firms do benefit from foreign direct investment, and it seems desirable for
policy makers to attract as much of it as possible. Our results suggest that policies to attract
FDI might be too strongly concentrated on large firms in urban areas, as it is there that indus-
try– and region–wide spillovers are mostly present. Instead, it might be desirable to also pro-
mote FDI inflows into those areas where spillovers are less present: non–urban areas with
small, non–durable goods producing firms. This would create even stronger overall spillovers
due to further backward and forward linkages, and therefore benefit the Ukrainian economy to
a larger extent. The mechanism to achieve this could consist in either the creation of a free
trade zone in such areas or in giving additional tax privileges to foreign firms investing there.
In a similar manner, Blomström and Kokko (2003) have pointed out that technological spill-
overs are not an automatic consequence of FDI, and that it is necessary to foster the learning
and absorbing capacity of domestic firms.
                                                                                                                                                    
21Defined as firms with less than 50 workers.
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Appendix 1: Variables used in the paper
· EERC database
- Volume of Export
- Sales
- Number of domestic firms in industry or region
· http://upop.irex.ru/eco.asp
- Nominal Gross Domestic Product
- Producer Price Index (PPI)
· Ukrainian statistic yearbooks, 1996-2000
- Volume of domestic investment in industry and region
- Volume of foreign investment in industry and region
- Number of manufacturing firms with FDI in industry and region
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Appendix 2: Linearization of the expression for optimal pro-
duction level
Optimal quantity, q  for the domestic firm:
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for all, small and large firms
µ s p25 p50 p75
all
  Exports, 1000 USD 4199.46 18759.46 63.80 321.25 1674.90
  Number of workers 776.23 1304.24 180.00 372.00 808.50
  F firms in region 91.39 108.25 33.00 52.00 109.00
  F firms in industry 167.79 94.91 107.00 178.65 222.82
  H firms in industry 1184.95 734.61 531.00 1384.18 1849.00
  H firms in region 242.28 130.81 192.00 237.00 314.00
small
  Exports, 1000 USD 741.50 2710.85 30.10 113.10 456.50
  Number of workers 113.07 47.11 77.00 116.00 148.00
  F firms in region 91.08 106.10 31.00 51.00 112.00
  F firms in industry 175.03 104.59 89.00 178.65 224.00
  H firms in industry 1273.95 773.83 568.00 1839.00 2009.00
  H firms in region 238.13 121.35 190.00 237.00 310.00
large
  Exports, 1000 USD 7109.07 25912.78 82.00 506.65 2912.00
  Number of workers 2181.39 2019.02 1090.00 1535.00 2438.00
  F firms in region 90.05 108.79 33.00 52.00 105.00
  F firms in industry 153.53 84.31 89.00 178.65 215.00
  H firms in industry 1049.48 685.27 501.00 1384.18 1839.00
  H firms in region 240.31 135.16 190.00 237.00 303.00
Note: (i) p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution,  while s  and µ represent its standard deviation and mean
respectively,  (ii) F denotes "foreign" and  H stands for ``home".
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics for durable, non—durable goods makers, city and non-
city firms.
Variable µ s p25 p50 p75
durable
  Exports, 1000 USD 4756.43 22099.45 46.65 251.00 1612.25
  Number of workers 691.28 1290.19 161.00 316.00 662.00
  F firms in region 89.68 110.04 33.00 51.00 104.00
  F firms in industry 164.41 92.31 107.00 178.65 222.82
  H firms in industry 1140.18 731.79 531.00 1384.18 1849.00
  H firms in region 236.13 128.62 190.00 237.00 303.00
non-durable
  Exports, 1000 USD 2782.76 10385.52 78.00 321.50 1297.00
  Number of workers 801.15 1197.31 197.00 415.00 910.00
  F firms in region 90.51 101.66 34.00 59.00 112.00
  F firms in industry 171.02 97.39 89.00 203.00 222.82
  H firms in industry 1233.71 737.15 568.00 1404.00 1849.00
  H firms in region 250.37 128.50 193.00 243.00 329.00
city
  Exports, 1000 USD 5491.93 22794.02 76.15 425.70 2161.80
  Number of workers 967.40 1638.95 201.00 426.00 1049.00
  F firms in region 161.10 138.03 80.00 113.00 160.00
  F firms in industry 159.41 95.09 59.00 203.00 222.82
  H firms in industry 1133.77 739.53 489.30 1384.18 1848.00
  H firms in region 270.61 187.59 240.00 297.00 390.00
non-city
  Exports, 1000USD 3314.32 15337.29 56.60 265.80 1369.40
  Number of workers 635.93 965.35 170.00 345.00 694.00
  F firms in region 43.65 33.02 24.00 35.00 51.00
  F firms in industry 173.52 94.37 108.00 178.65 222.82
  H firms in industry 1220.00 729.21 538.80 1384.18 1849.00
  H firms in region 222.88 61.69 187.00 220.00 250.00
Note: (i) p25, p50 and p75 represent the quartiles of the distribution, while s  and µ represent its standard deviation and mean
respectively, (ii) F denotes "foreign" and  H stands for ``home".
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics by region.
Variable Observa-
tions
Export,
1000 USD
Labor F Firms FDI, 1000
USD
Crimea 255 4287.36 637.14 43.6 26285.25
Sebastopol 82 543.30 271.11 3.8 2828.23
Vinnitsa 527 3151.69 484.60 28.6 3319.25
Volyn 292 1613.33 600.40 22.2 9275.58
Dnipropetrovsk 702 12978.69 1557.10 111.8 22247.36
Donetsk 886 7182.00 1260.43 101.1 41995.08
Zhytomyr 552 1778.49 602.83 34.8 4762.37
Zakarpattia 610 2800.53 438.86 133.4 13981.86
Zaporizhzhia 485 8983.56 1175.71 46.8 41098.11
Ivano-Frankivsk 396 3563.93 621.58 67.8 4406.80
Kyiv-city 727 3568.15 664.04 468.0 202988.80
Kyivregion 474 2459.85 495.66 64.8 43715.80
Kirovograd 256 1355.28 532.25 13.6 2551.80
Lugansk 488 6341.76 930.78 35.6 1532.92
Lviv 862 1795.17 598.26 170.0 21168.68
Mykolayiv 216 6575.36 1036.35 41.2 4933.74
Odesa 506 2136.08 433.98 113.6 25498.87
Poltava 463 5325.92 716.66 49.8 40003.81
Rivne 323 1930.70 540.50 23.8 6314.97
Sumy 410 4378.26 889.60 30.0 3702.03
Ternopil 256 1601.48 509.84 31.0 2532.29
Kharkiv 756 2630.41 966.15 72.8 15069.69
Kherson 151 2706.47 1097.91 48.2 6609.32
Khmelnytsky 414 2558.86 659.46 32.8 1675.11
Cherkasy 423 4888.08 605.59 48.2 2514.16
Chernivtsi 384 3115.57 563.14 17.2 5052.36
Chernigiv 218 1853.71 504.19 18.8 4379.49
Note: All variables are averaged over the period 1996-2000  for each region.
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics by industry.
Variable Observa-
tions
Export,
1000 USD
Labor F Firms FDI
Energy 46 1203.42 2794.00 1.8 1944.17
Fuel 96 19364.66 1261.24 15.6 50235.07
Ferrous metallurgy 491 20923.36 2032.58 27.6 34991.29
Non-ferrous metallurgy 105 20593.62 1138.44 14.0 23.45
Chemicals 498 10272.15 1139.57 90.6 8794.23
Oil-Chemicals 103 4431.05 833.66 6.4 6131.91
Metal processing 4237 3304.07 1002.01 242.6 59189.58
Wood and Paper 1308 1258.62 458.67 122.0 9043.57
Construction materials 906 1463.32 608.27 59.8 1276.98
Light 1285 4173.12 617.87 150.4 3517.94
Food 2420 2920.44 380.23 320.6 125075.00
Flavor 193 728.40 205.89 2.8 4.67
Microbiology 43 736.07 345.71 19.4 1316.25
Medical equipment 178 1782.20 567.60 19.8 5056.05
Printing 79 891.11 302.63 28.4 1214.89
Others 126 7849.95 381.95 28.2 1885.76
Note: All variables are averaged over the period 1996-2000 for each industry.
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Table 5: OLS, Within and GMM estimations for all firms.
OLS WITHIN ONE-STEP TWO-STEP
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exportt-1 0.6761*** 0.0075 0.0635* 0.0240
( 0.0142 ) ( 0.021 ) ( 0.0370 ) ( 0.0392 )
Labort 0.2888*** 0.9447*** 0.3739 0.5562
( 0.0231 ) ( 0.1234 ) ( 0.3826 ) ( 0.3956 )
F firms in regiont -0.0001 0.0059*** 0.0056** 0.0039
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0029 ) ( 0.0029 )
F firms in industryt 0.0052*** 0.0075*** 0.0052*** 0.0064***
( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0015 ) ( 0.0015 )
H firms in industryt -0.0008*** -0.0010*** -0.0008*** -0.0007**
( 0.0000 ) ( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0003 )
H firms in regiont 0.0000 0.0036*** 0.0031** 0.0039***
( 0.0002 ) ( 0.0011 ) ( 0.0013 ) ( 0.0013 )
F investment in regiont 0.0017 -0.0277 -0.0038 -0.0364
( 0.0397 ) ( 0.0373 ) ( 0.0554 ) ( 0.0534 )
F investment in industryt -0.2044*** -0.0754*** -0.0491 -0.0360
( 0.0278 ) ( 0.0281 ) ( 0.0386 ) ( 0.0381 )
H investment in regiont 0.0705* 0.4922*** 0.8613*** 0.6773***
( 0.0409 ) ( 0.1361 ) ( 0.2659 ) ( 0.2504 )
H investment in industryt 0.1841*** 0.3958*** 0.1111 0.0265
( 0.0256 ) ( 0.0637 ) ( 0.1137 ) ( 0.1062 )
N 6009 5244 3545 3545
Sargan test - - - 0.109
SOC - - 0.964 0.863
R-sq 0.6176 0.0794 - -
Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variable, besides numbers of H/F firms in region/industry are in
log form, (ii) all equations include time dummies and constant, (iii) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv)
*** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the  5%,  * at the 10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment re-
strictions of the endogenous explanatory variables, (vi) SOC is Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation, (viii) all
estimations calculated using DPD package for Ox.
28
Table 6: GMM estimations for durable and non-durable goods makers.
durable non-durable
one-step two-step one-step two-step
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exportt-1 0.0160 0.017 0.1647** 0.1235
( 0.0506 ) ( 0.0524 ) ( 0.0678 ) ( 0.0777 )
Labort 0.1183 0.0015 0.3545 0.0041
( 0.4937 ) ( 0.5150 ) ( 0.7672 ) ( 0.8634 )
F firms in industryt 0.0094** 0.0064*** 0.0012 -0.0003
( 0.0039 ) ( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0047 ) ( 0.0049 )
F firms in regiont 0.0044* 0.0069*** 0.0003 0.0042
( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0025 ) ( 0.0030 ) ( 0.0029 )
H firms in industryt -0.0010** -0.0011*** 0.0000 -0.0001
( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 )
H firms in regiont 0.0024 0.0055 -0.0013 0.0012
( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0021 )
F investment in regiont 0.02557 0.0338 0.0067 0.0054
( 0.0745 ) ( 0.0693 ) ( 0.1002 ) ( 0.0969 )
F investment in industryt -0.0004 0.0263 -0.0480 -0.0348
( 0.0609 ) ( 0.0590 ) ( 0.0632 ) ( 0.0564 )
H investment in regiont 0.0608 -0.0115 1.0282** 0.8948*
( 0.3176 ) ( 0.3286 ) ( 0.4954 ) ( 0.4616 )
H investment in industryt -0.0905 -0.0011 0.1131 0.2364
( 0.1544 ) ( 0.1348 ) ( 0.2068 ) ( 0.1997 )
N 1396 1396 1186 1186
Sargan test - 0.140 - 0.363
SOC 0.871 0.829 0.132 0.185
Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variable, besides numbers of H/F firms in region/industry are in
log form, (ii) all equations include time dummies and constant, (iii) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv)
*** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the  5%,  * at the 10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment re-
strictions of the endogenous explanatory variables, (vi) SOC is Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation, (viii) all
estimations calculated using DPD package for Ox.
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Table 7: GMM estimations for small and large firms.
small large
one-step two-step one-step two-step
Independent variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Exportt-1 -0.1595 -0.1592** -0.0084 -0.0038
( 0.0561 ) ( 0.0652 ) ( 0.0660 ) ( 0.0373 )
Labort 0.1832 0.3185 0.2974 0.8868
( 0.4010 ) ( 0.9579 ) ( 0.8127 ) ( 0.7684 )
F firms in industryt 0.0042 0.0072* -0.0035 0.0026
( 0.0044 ) ( 0.0042 ) ( 0.0076 ) ( 0.0074 )
F firms in regiont -0.0004 0.0026 0.0128*** 0.0123***
( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0045 ) ( 0.0035 ) ( 0.0036 )
H firms in industryt -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0007
( 0.0007 ) ( 0.0009 ) ( 0.0005 ) ( 0.0004 )
H firms in regiont 0.0002 0.0021 0.0076*** 0.0079***
( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0022 ) ( 0.0020 )
F investment in regiont -0.1671 -0.0493 -0.0781 -0.1324
( 0.1826 ) ( 0.1904 ) ( 0.0901 ) ( 0.0877 )
F investment in industryt 0.0724 -0.0129 -0.0058 -0.0229
( 0.1408 ) ( 0.1416 ) ( 0.0649 ) ( 0.0579 )
H investment in regiont 0.5246 -0.0931 1.4159** 10.123
( 0.7106 ) ( 0.5678 ) ( 0.5886 ) ( 0.6176 )
H investment in industryt 0.3142 0.3078 0.2491 0.1998
( 0.3100 ) ( 0.3927 ) ( 0.1840 ) ( 0.1895 )
N 431 431 1023 1023
Sargan test - 0.671 - 0.453
SOC 0.831 0.760 0.187 0.229
Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variable, besides numbers of H/F firms in region/industry are in
log form, (ii) all equations include time dummies and constant, (iii) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv)
*** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the  5%,  * at the 10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment re-
strictions of the endogenous explanatory variables, (vi) SOC is Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation, (viii) all
estimations calculated using DPD package for Ox.
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Table 8: GMM estimations for city and non-city firms.
city non-city
one-step two-step one-step two-step
Independent variable -1 -2 -3 -4
Exportt-1 0.1340*** 0.0884 0.0394 0.0369
( 0.0498 ) ( 0.0596 ) ( 0.0497 ) ( 0.0568 )
Labort 0.0097 0.2592 0.7724 0.1333
( 0.4932 ) ( 0.4498 ) ( 0.4849 ) ( 0.4870 )
F firms in industryt 0.0110*** 0.0092** 0.0044 0.0031
( 0.0036 ) ( 0.0041 ) ( 0.0038 ) ( 0.0039 )
F firms in regiont 0.0043** 0.0049** 0.0009 0.0038
( 0.002 ) ( 0.0023 ) ( 0.004 ) ( 0.0043 )
H firms in industryt -0.0005 -0.0003 -0.0007 -0.0007
( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0003 ) ( 0.0004 ) ( 0.0004 )
H firms in regiont 0.0019 0.0020 0.0111*** 0.0103***
( 0.0018 ) ( 0.0021 ) ( 0.0027 ) ( 0.0027 )
F investment in regiont -0.0641 -0.0419 0.0571 0.0046
( 0.0556 ) ( 0.0567 ) ( 0.0849 ) ( 0.0846 )
F investment in industryt -0.0746 -0.0846* -0.0402 -0.0045
( 0.0521 ) ( 0.0505 ) ( 0.580 ) ( 0.0580 )
H investment in regiont 0.9195*** 0.8821*** 1.9932*** 1.4743***
( 0.3060 ) ( 0.3122 ) ( 0.5749 ) ( 0.5409 )
H investment in industryt 0.1907 -0.0063 0.0951 -0.0041
( 0.1577 ) ( 0.1549 ) ( 0.1642 ) ( 0.1524 )
N 1603 1603 1946 1946
Sargan test 0.202 0.687 0.000 0.048
FOC 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
SOC 0.857 0.874 0.747 0.843
Note. (i) Dependent variable: log of export; all independent variable, besides numbers of H/F firms in region/industry are in
log form, (ii) all equations include time dummies and constant, (iii) heteroscedastic consistent standard errors in brackets, (iv)
*** denotes significant at the 1%, ** at the  5%,  * at the 10% level, (v) instruments include some or all available moment re-
strictions of the endogenous explanatory variables, (vi) SOC is Arellano-Bond test for second order autocorrelation, (viii) all
estimations calculated using DPD package for Ox.
